Canadian Armed Forces Defence Review - Back to the Future

This from a retired officer just musing in to the wind. If I have something to contribute, I might as well - it's free and I've lived under many successive Canadian government's defence (in)decisions. Play along if you wish. Thanks for getting this far if you don't.

First, I joined the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1987 as a Direct Entry Officer Air Navigator at the age of 25. I like to think of myself as a little more worldly than my peers, some who were direct out of high school and 18 years old, or others direct out of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) where one could argue well rounded worldly perspectives might not have been on offer, though not unavailable.

I was also the product of a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) officer who joined in 1959 and followed the non-degreed path through what would now be called a Naval academy at HMCS Venture - a single year as a naval cadet. My father went through unification in the late '60s and I remember to this day his anger at arriving at an exchange posting with the US Navy in Army green with the rank of Major.

My career featured some wide experiences - 15 years of CP140 Aurora operations and leadership across the western hemisphere, sailing on a submarine, evaluating NATO PfP nations for their readiness, serving in three Naval headquarters, planning and executing expeditionary operations and logistics, serving overseas, serving as a planner and leader at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), and many more. So with the backdrop of a military brat, unification, the 1987 Defence White paper, not wearing uniforms off base due to the public's dim view of the military after the Somalia scandal, a wide range of military operational experiences, and finally some fairly robust contact with Professional Military Education (PME) and national security academia I come to you with some opinions about Canada's national defence policy, on the cusp of another review.

First, where have we been? And second, what should the foundation of a defence review be? From these two questions we could possibly build a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) fit for Canadian purpose in the world, because at heart I believe Canadians want a CAF that resonates with them, not a pure warfighting machine designed as an expeditionary conqueror.

Where have we been? In my humble opinion many CAF issues today have roots in unification. Not that I believe unification was necessarily bad, but I do believe unification was done simply as a force efficiency measure - consolidate the essential functions of administration and logistics into one organization instead of the previous three separate Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), RCN and Canadian Army (CA) support organizations. But what I do believe is unification, some would say simply because of the standardized army green uniforms and ranks across the entire force no matter what the function, created a generation of soldiers, sailors and aviators who lacked identity - and were angry about it. As a remedy, the current initiatives to go back to pips and crowns, and Naval ranks are a small measure to find an identity.

Where have we been in force structure? Well, in the past, as an example, the RCN featured a blue water Navy of an aircraft carrier, submarines, aviation, frigates, destroyers, minesweepers - a comprehensive force of the capabilities needed for blue water and expeditionary operations with the aim of local sea control when needed. Truly the vision of what a post WW2 Navy should be according to Naval minds. What has changed are year adjusted budgets, the peace dividend, and the doctrine of multi-purpose platforms (simply in the name of efficiency and cost savings?) - but the RCN thinking and doctrine is essentially unchanged - they just have to get by with multi purpose platforms now, and support allies as best they can due to their force available.

Similarly in the RCAF, and as another example as a supporting commander to CA operations, the force structure included light reconnaissance, heavy transport, and robust tactical maneuver helicopters (Kiowa, Chinook, single/twin Hueys), designed for robust land operations. In my view CA air operational doctrine has not changed, but what has changed is the removal of those platforms, and their replacement with a small, light, and not so Army capable Griffon. Why? Cost savings and efficiency? The results of those decisions, and unchanging doctrine resulted in much wringing of hands, and arguably deaths in Afghanistan as Canada begged, borrowed, and contracted helicopter support for their extremely challenging land operations. Air Task Force Mali? All about helicopters. Similar to the RCN, basic land doctrine, in my view, was essentially unchanged, but money and efficiency ruled force structure. 

Of course I would be remiss by not mentioning the CA's lack of anti-air, anti-tank, and air ISR and attack capabilities that might bring it to a more capable land force able to operate without major allies, but those capabilities have never seriously been fielded or considered for the CA - another discussion for the more learned Army officers amongst us.

In the RCN, the surface force has been reduced to multi-purpose frigates - not particularly good at any one thing, but modestly capable at some things, some used diesel electric submarines, and some minor vessels good for projecting a flag. The RCN still uses Mahanian doctrines of sea power and control - they project frigates in what one could argue is some sort of gun boat diplomacy. They use freedom of navigation doctrines, and they articulate (though don't really demonstrate with much influence) weaponized operations. But it's a narrow and shallow RCN - a few frigates, aviation assets (the maritime helicopter arguably a frigate's most important asset) struggling for operational readiness after successive government failures on the file, non weaponized coastal vessels, and few old diesel electric submarines capable of only sporadic expeditionary ops.

As successive Generals built the modern RCAF - some cold warriors, some with US Air Force doctrine on their brains. some with only fighter or transport or land helicopter experience, those successive Generals made the decision to have all aviation assets in the CAF wear an RCAF uniform. The result is an RCAF that does not stand on its own - the RCAF is mostly a supporting organization to the CA and RCN. It is rare that the RCAF conducts domestic or expeditionary operations itself - the RCAF, in CAF terms, is a supporting Commander.

This RCAF posture, along with the RCAF's imported USAF Command and Control doctrine of centralized Command and decentralized execution, leaves the RCAF somewhat confused most days. For example, in the RCAF there is almost never a day without a conversation on Command and Control (C2) - who is the commander, who owns decisions, and at what level? - symptoms of a lack of understanding, not just in the RCAF, but CAF wide, of what the RCAF is and what it does.

With the backdrop of unification, the doctrinal and force structure realities of the CAF, the CAF "fought" the Cold War. There was a common enemy, and there was an objective. It was hardly a Cold War - it was very hot at times, but the CAF had a purpose.

Enter Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev and the peace dividend. A quote from the World Bank is instructive: 

"the key policy implication of this study is straightforward: The Peace Dividend 

from military spending cuts is likely to be very substantial over the longer term. 

Thus reductions in military spending should be viewed as attractive structural 

policy elements of macroeconomic packages designed to enhance the growth 

path of capacity output." 

World Bank - POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1577, The Peace Dividend Military Spending Cuts and Economic Growth, Feb 1996

If one cuts through the economic blurb, you can see the pressure governments were under to cut defence spending after the Cold War. And they did. Without citing a bunch of policy, budgets and whatnot, essentially this is what happened between 1960 and 2000 to Western defence budgets:

Now I am hardly an economist, or a politician, but I did live in a military that was faced with these real budget cuts, and experienced daily the hand wringing that happened at all levels (do we buy paper and pens this month, or send a crew away for training?). Those that understood threats existed still, and witnessed very real programme cancellations, delays, and denials due to this Peace Dividend were justifiably frustrated - but cuts continued, and arguably continue to have an effect (like, say, the Force Reduction Programme where thousands of CAF members were given money to leave in the mid-90s, leaving demographic holes that existed until only recently), on politician's decisions (why do we need to spend money? Spending won't get me a vote), on CAF members and on Canada at large.

So, exiting the Cold War and dealing with large defence budget cuts along with the backdrop of unchanged doctrines and unification leaves the CAF in it's situation today - under resourced, partially adrift as doctrines don't match force structure, and in inconclusive operations like Mali, NORAD, the South China Sea and many others. And now, climate change.

Yes, climate change is real. Yes the CAF will be called to help Canadians, likely more in the future. The CAF must respond - how the government resources the CAF to respond is the key issue. Does the Federal government hold provincial governments to account for their clearly provincial responsibilities? Or does the federal government, fund a new domestic response capability for the CAF? I am far from an expert, though I have worked disaster response and been in several provincial disaster scenarios as an advisor. What I would say is there's a huge opportunity to create Reserve Force jobs in local and regional areas of Canada specifically for these tasks. Suffice it to say, tasks to support to Canadians in domestic emergencies will likely continue to grow for the CAF.

And a current dire situation in the CAF is personnel. Culture change, pay, housing, benefits are just some of the personnel pressures on the CAF right now. there is a dire need for professional strategic human resources, and also dollars direct in to CAF member's pockets to incentivize them to join and stay.

Where do we go from here? The backdrop of unification, the Cold War and subsequent peace dividend, the repeated starving of the CAF of resources and capabilities while in parallel neither the CAF nor the government has articulated any change in doctrinal roles, defence procurement disasters and questions like NATO's 2% of GDP doctrine, and rust out, and now climate change.

I do not have the answer. I do know that much of the near term could be addressed by Steve Saideman's latest precis here https://saideman.blogspot.com/2023/07/my-dream-defence-policy-update.html

But I also believe Canadians would do themselves a great service by engagement on defence, showing an understanding of the dangers of the world and how their lives would be impacted by, say, an invasion of Taiwan, for example, or the Ukraine war metastasizing into a wider conflict, or a hostile submarine shutting down a major strategic trade route. And the government, all governments, providing cogent and well reasoned defence policies, including addressing industries and procurement, to voters.

Just why does Canada need an RCN frigate in the Mediterranean, and what does that cost to develop, build, train, and deploy, as well as have a follow on capability in development?

Just why does the CAF deploy to Kuwait and what are the real costs of developing a strategic airlift capability to support that mission?

Just why do CP140's, RCN ships and submarines operate in the east China sea from time to time?

And asking these questions when in reality the development of these capabilities takes decades and decades across multiple governments is really the key - are we willing to play politics with defence procurement like Jean Chretien cancelling massive helicopter contracts to win a majority government?

The CAF must be funded appropriately in the near term, and must institute some urgent corrective measures on, say, personnel, right now. Because if there's no people, there's no defence. But Canadians should also ask them selves some hard questions, and hold their elected representatives, across all levels of government, accountable for a cogent and integrated defence policy, including climate change, recognizing where the CAF has been, and what the elected representatives need to do to generate a positive CAF future for all Canadians.