The case for the Boeing P8 - a replacement for the RCAF's CP140 Aurora

Hello dear readers. If you made it this far, welcome!

So for those that know me from my career, or my various internet ramblings, mostly on @pbontoast1, I am a proponent of the P8 Poseidon as a replacement to the quickly ageing Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CP140 Aurora. Why? Follow on.

First, I make no claim to be THE expert in military operations, procurement, policy, economics, or whatever else. I am what I am, just a private citizen now with some experience that might be relevant, and a perspective that may be worth something. You decide. I also prefer not to blast a long list of credentials that might be relevant, though I can provide you a CV by other means if you wish. 

I prefer to stand on logic and truth, not by "you must believe me because I say so earnestly and with firm hand gestures, and here are all my post-nomials", which I desperately dislike from the retired senior officer crowd in particular.

What I'll cover in this piece is the case for Canada purchasing the P8 Poseidon. There's any number of ways to approach this issue - economics and price, availability, capability, requirements, interoperability, and so forth. Many of these I'll talk about. But I want to back up and start with an approach that is honestly forgotten in many conversations about the CP140 and the P8, and that's what this capability has provided for Canadians, and what it should provide for Canadians in the future. All too often a cloud of secrecy shades or hides what this capability does and why it is so vital for Canadians. If voters and taxpayers never see the results of this labour, how will they ever know what these people and aircraft do?

So, in this spirit and in the style of story telling - a style which resonates with everyone, not just defence, Air Force, academics, or policy makers, lets continue.

In 1993 a CP140 was continuously deployed to Sicily with warshot torpedoes for NATO Operation SHARP GUARD. The only deployment of a CP140 with live weapons, this operation was designed to enforce the arms embargo of Serbia and also to protect the various naval vessels deployed to the Adriatic from a submarine threat. The operation continued for a year and then was extended for another year without weapons. A solid contribution to stability in the region.

On 22 February, 1994 a ship was seized by HMCS Terra Nova of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in international waters east of Nova Scotia. That ship, the Motor Vessel (MV) Pacifico, was eventually found to have transported more than 5 tons of cocaine to Canada. Central to the published story was Terra Nova and her boarding party as well as the legal arguments required to seize a ship in international waters. Not well known is the role surveillance played in the take down, from international intelligence gathering to identify the shipment, to the police, to tracking the shipment from it's origin, to the take down. A vital part of the take down was evidence that the MV Pacifico was truly involved in smuggling drugs into Canada, and especially since she remained in international waters for her entire voyage, never entering Canadian waters. What happened was those that were watching the ship witnessed a second small vessel rendezvous with the Pacifico, remain alongside for a period of time, then return to a Canadian port thereby establishing a link to Canadian soil. In the doctrine of hot pursuit the Terra Nova was then authorized to stop and seize the Pacifico as it fled away from Canada. The smaller vessel was also seized at the Canadian port by police. While a number of sensors were watching events unfold, a CP140 Aurora was at the center of the evidence required for the arrests. A massive drug bust and solid contribution to Canadian security.

On 9/10 December 1994 the MV Salvador Allende foundered and sank in a storm 1200 nautical miles east of the US. This was an extreme distance for any land based search and rescue assets to get to, let alone rescue anyone in life rafts or adrift. As part of a huge effort between passing vessels who aided the search, US Coast Guard, US Air National Guard, US Marines and RCAF C130 and CP140 aircraft the scene was searched and a few survivors plucked from the ocean by long range air to air refueled helicopters. The CP140 with it's range, endurance, crew, communications suite and sensors was an ideal platform to coordinate the search efforts of multiple ships and aircraft that arrived on scene. Without that coordination, the search would not be effective, and multiple CP140 missions flew on the rescue - in the end, the RCAF flew 15 missions to the limits of their endurance in terrible weather, accumulating more than 150 flight hours. https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/10/nyregion/atlantic-storm-casts-31-adrift-as-ship-sinks.html

On 13 November 1998 the RCAF tasked a crew from 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia to support the Department of Fisheries and Oceans by carrying a Fisheries Officer and conducting surveillance of the fishing fleets on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The crew flew from Greenwood to St John's, Nfld to pick up the fisheries officer, then flew the surveillance mission at low level over fishing fleets covering most of the Grand Banks fishing fleets, most outside but very near Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles off shore in that area. This type of presence and surveillance sends a message to fishing fleets that Canada is interested and watching, reducing over fishing and violations of fishing bans. The crew flew for more than 10 hours that day and again the range and endurance of the large aircraft along with its sensors and crew makes this mission possible, and also impossible for smaller lighter aircraft.

In March 1998 a CP140 crew deployed to Andoya, Norway to fly 50 hours over several weeks in support of a large NATO maritime exercise in the Norwegian Sea. The capability to quickly deploy and integrate with a large NATO force in a wartime scenario exercise is critical for Canada's support to NATO and its allies. No other aircraft could deploy this quickly, at that distance, and integrate with a NATO maritime force so quickly in a wartime scenario.

Currently CP140 Auroras and the RCN routinely deploy to Asia under Operation NEON, consisting of maritime surveillance in support of UN sanctions. Again, deploying at such a distance from Canada requires logistical support - parts, expertise etc which no other capability could achieve at such a distance from Canada and complete the surveillance mission. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html

And so on. And I haven't even talked about some of the larger wartime missions like Operation IMPACT, or Operation SIRIUS, or Operation APOLLO - I'm sure my colleagues can tell considerable stories about those deployments.

These missions and stories could not be told without a long range, large aircraft with sufficient crew, sensor and weapons, properly supported in distant deployment locations, and an ability to integrate with other forces.

The question now is what can replace the rapidly ageing CP140 and its crew, sensors and weapons if we value these missions as Canadians?

Well.

I want to cut to the chase quite quickly and state that no aircraft other than the P8 Poseidon can carry the weapons and sensors needed for these missions. Just in two critical areas alone - to carry the weight of the stores and weapons, and to generate the power required to energize the communications and mission equipment is quite difficult and near impossible for smaller aircraft. Let's explore these two areas.

On electrical power, it becomes very clear when engineers calculate the kVa (kilovolt-amps, a typical measure of the power of an electrical system) required to run concurrently the sensors, flight systems, navigation, and communication systems required for the missions above that smaller aircraft will have severe deficiencies and large trade offs, or be completely incapable of generating the required power to do the mission.

On weapons. The primary weapon of the CP140 and P8 Poseidon is the light weight Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) torpedo, though both aircraft could carry a wide range of weapons for other missions. Lightweight torpedoes are fire and forget weapons that have their own active sonar in the nose. Drop the weapon in a good position, the torpedo finds and neutralizes its target independently. Lightweight torpedoes have a lot going on under the hood - an active sonar in the nose, electronics, propulsion, and stabilizing parachutes. This means that current and capable light weight torpedoes require a heated bomb bay to protect the weapon from the extreme elements of long range aviation. Could lightweight torpedoes be carried under the wings? Not in their current design, no, but of course a new weapon could be developed to do so - it would take a significant engineering and test effort however.

Only one aircraft is suitable for the power generation and bomb bay capabilities required - the P8 Poseidon. I will concede I know little about the Japanese P1 currently flying with Japanese forces, other than it has not been seriously offered for sale outside of Japan, and doesn't seem fully operational yet, even after twenty years of development. An analysis of the required interoperability with NATO and Canada's allies would likely uncover deficiencies in communication systems, sensors and the like which would seriously degrade the performance of the P1 in missions that Canada values with its partners.

On these two aspects alone - electrical power and weapons, the P8 Poseidon is the sole aircraft that can meet the missions stated for the Canadian Multi Mission Aircraft requirement http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2016/aerospace-systems-57.page

Don't get me wrong - I'm not a Boeing shill. I would much prefer, as would most of my colleagues I'm sure, a four engine turbo prop aircraft. Most of us were skeptical of the 737 as a basis for a new long range patrol aircraft simply because it could not operate as freely as the P3/CP140 at low levels over water, typically below 1000 feet while on station. Conducting anti submarine warfare requires the accuracy and precision gained by being much closer to your target - low level. Operating two high bypass turbo fan engines at low level where they are less efficient (turbo props become more efficient at lower levels due to the density of air) and subject to corrosion from salt air and at risk of ingesting birds has always been and will continue to be an issue with the P8. In addition the P8 is simply a much larger wing than the P3/CP140 making it less maneuverable, a trait much less desirable while tracking very quick and stealthy submarines. Many of us suffered significant turbulence and G forces while chasing very quick submarines in stiff winged P3/CP140s - the P8 is likely less capable in this area, and advances in sensors will offset this trait to some degree, but the bottom line is a lightweight torpedo must be placed very accurately, at low level, to have any chance of finding and attacking its target before fuel starvation.

Of course there are many other aspects to the P8 that could be discussed and I may add to this article in the future. But for me the bottom line is the missions that Canadians value must continue, and the only aircraft available that meets our requirements is the P8 Poseidon.

Canadian Armed Forces Defence Review - Back to the Future

This from a retired officer just musing in to the wind. If I have something to contribute, I might as well - it's free and I've lived under many successive Canadian government's defence (in)decisions. Play along if you wish. Thanks for getting this far if you don't.

First, I joined the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1987 as a Direct Entry Officer Air Navigator at the age of 25. I like to think of myself as a little more worldly than my peers, some who were direct out of high school and 18 years old, or others direct out of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) where one could argue well rounded worldly perspectives might not have been on offer, though not unavailable.

I was also the product of a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) officer who joined in 1959 and followed the non-degreed path through what would now be called a Naval academy at HMCS Venture - a single year as a naval cadet. My father went through unification in the late '60s and I remember to this day his anger at arriving at an exchange posting with the US Navy in Army green with the rank of Major.

My career featured some wide experiences - 15 years of CP140 Aurora operations and leadership across the western hemisphere, sailing on a submarine, evaluating NATO PfP nations for their readiness, serving in three Naval headquarters, planning and executing expeditionary operations and logistics, serving overseas, serving as a planner and leader at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), and many more. So with the backdrop of a military brat, unification, the 1987 Defence White paper, not wearing uniforms off base due to the public's dim view of the military after the Somalia scandal, a wide range of military operational experiences, and finally some fairly robust contact with Professional Military Education (PME) and national security academia I come to you with some opinions about Canada's national defence policy, on the cusp of another review.

First, where have we been? And second, what should the foundation of a defence review be? From these two questions we could possibly build a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) fit for Canadian purpose in the world, because at heart I believe Canadians want a CAF that resonates with them, not a pure warfighting machine designed as an expeditionary conqueror.

Where have we been? In my humble opinion many CAF issues today have roots in unification. Not that I believe unification was necessarily bad, but I do believe unification was done simply as a force efficiency measure - consolidate the essential functions of administration and logistics into one organization instead of the previous three separate Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), RCN and Canadian Army (CA) support organizations. But what I do believe is unification, some would say simply because of the standardized army green uniforms and ranks across the entire force no matter what the function, created a generation of soldiers, sailors and aviators who lacked identity - and were angry about it. As a remedy, the current initiatives to go back to pips and crowns, and Naval ranks are a small measure to find an identity.

Where have we been in force structure? Well, in the past, as an example, the RCN featured a blue water Navy of an aircraft carrier, submarines, aviation, frigates, destroyers, minesweepers - a comprehensive force of the capabilities needed for blue water and expeditionary operations with the aim of local sea control when needed. Truly the vision of what a post WW2 Navy should be according to Naval minds. What has changed are year adjusted budgets, the peace dividend, and the doctrine of multi-purpose platforms (simply in the name of efficiency and cost savings?) - but the RCN thinking and doctrine is essentially unchanged - they just have to get by with multi purpose platforms now, and support allies as best they can due to their force available.

Similarly in the RCAF, and as another example as a supporting commander to CA operations, the force structure included light reconnaissance, heavy transport, and robust tactical maneuver helicopters (Kiowa, Chinook, single/twin Hueys), designed for robust land operations. In my view CA air operational doctrine has not changed, but what has changed is the removal of those platforms, and their replacement with a small, light, and not so Army capable Griffon. Why? Cost savings and efficiency? The results of those decisions, and unchanging doctrine resulted in much wringing of hands, and arguably deaths in Afghanistan as Canada begged, borrowed, and contracted helicopter support for their extremely challenging land operations. Air Task Force Mali? All about helicopters. Similar to the RCN, basic land doctrine, in my view, was essentially unchanged, but money and efficiency ruled force structure. 

Of course I would be remiss by not mentioning the CA's lack of anti-air, anti-tank, and air ISR and attack capabilities that might bring it to a more capable land force able to operate without major allies, but those capabilities have never seriously been fielded or considered for the CA - another discussion for the more learned Army officers amongst us.

In the RCN, the surface force has been reduced to multi-purpose frigates - not particularly good at any one thing, but modestly capable at some things, some used diesel electric submarines, and some minor vessels good for projecting a flag. The RCN still uses Mahanian doctrines of sea power and control - they project frigates in what one could argue is some sort of gun boat diplomacy. They use freedom of navigation doctrines, and they articulate (though don't really demonstrate with much influence) weaponized operations. But it's a narrow and shallow RCN - a few frigates, aviation assets (the maritime helicopter arguably a frigate's most important asset) struggling for operational readiness after successive government failures on the file, non weaponized coastal vessels, and few old diesel electric submarines capable of only sporadic expeditionary ops.

As successive Generals built the modern RCAF - some cold warriors, some with US Air Force doctrine on their brains. some with only fighter or transport or land helicopter experience, those successive Generals made the decision to have all aviation assets in the CAF wear an RCAF uniform. The result is an RCAF that does not stand on its own - the RCAF is mostly a supporting organization to the CA and RCN. It is rare that the RCAF conducts domestic or expeditionary operations itself - the RCAF, in CAF terms, is a supporting Commander.

This RCAF posture, along with the RCAF's imported USAF Command and Control doctrine of centralized Command and decentralized execution, leaves the RCAF somewhat confused most days. For example, in the RCAF there is almost never a day without a conversation on Command and Control (C2) - who is the commander, who owns decisions, and at what level? - symptoms of a lack of understanding, not just in the RCAF, but CAF wide, of what the RCAF is and what it does.

With the backdrop of unification, the doctrinal and force structure realities of the CAF, the CAF "fought" the Cold War. There was a common enemy, and there was an objective. It was hardly a Cold War - it was very hot at times, but the CAF had a purpose.

Enter Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev and the peace dividend. A quote from the World Bank is instructive: 

"the key policy implication of this study is straightforward: The Peace Dividend 

from military spending cuts is likely to be very substantial over the longer term. 

Thus reductions in military spending should be viewed as attractive structural 

policy elements of macroeconomic packages designed to enhance the growth 

path of capacity output." 

World Bank - POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1577, The Peace Dividend Military Spending Cuts and Economic Growth, Feb 1996

If one cuts through the economic blurb, you can see the pressure governments were under to cut defence spending after the Cold War. And they did. Without citing a bunch of policy, budgets and whatnot, essentially this is what happened between 1960 and 2000 to Western defence budgets:

Now I am hardly an economist, or a politician, but I did live in a military that was faced with these real budget cuts, and experienced daily the hand wringing that happened at all levels (do we buy paper and pens this month, or send a crew away for training?). Those that understood threats existed still, and witnessed very real programme cancellations, delays, and denials due to this Peace Dividend were justifiably frustrated - but cuts continued, and arguably continue to have an effect (like, say, the Force Reduction Programme where thousands of CAF members were given money to leave in the mid-90s, leaving demographic holes that existed until only recently), on politician's decisions (why do we need to spend money? Spending won't get me a vote), on CAF members and on Canada at large.

So, exiting the Cold War and dealing with large defence budget cuts along with the backdrop of unchanged doctrines and unification leaves the CAF in it's situation today - under resourced, partially adrift as doctrines don't match force structure, and in inconclusive operations like Mali, NORAD, the South China Sea and many others. And now, climate change.

Yes, climate change is real. Yes the CAF will be called to help Canadians, likely more in the future. The CAF must respond - how the government resources the CAF to respond is the key issue. Does the Federal government hold provincial governments to account for their clearly provincial responsibilities? Or does the federal government, fund a new domestic response capability for the CAF? I am far from an expert, though I have worked disaster response and been in several provincial disaster scenarios as an advisor. What I would say is there's a huge opportunity to create Reserve Force jobs in local and regional areas of Canada specifically for these tasks. Suffice it to say, tasks to support to Canadians in domestic emergencies will likely continue to grow for the CAF.

And a current dire situation in the CAF is personnel. Culture change, pay, housing, benefits are just some of the personnel pressures on the CAF right now. there is a dire need for professional strategic human resources, and also dollars direct in to CAF member's pockets to incentivize them to join and stay.

Where do we go from here? The backdrop of unification, the Cold War and subsequent peace dividend, the repeated starving of the CAF of resources and capabilities while in parallel neither the CAF nor the government has articulated any change in doctrinal roles, defence procurement disasters and questions like NATO's 2% of GDP doctrine, and rust out, and now climate change.

I do not have the answer. I do know that much of the near term could be addressed by Steve Saideman's latest precis here https://saideman.blogspot.com/2023/07/my-dream-defence-policy-update.html

But I also believe Canadians would do themselves a great service by engagement on defence, showing an understanding of the dangers of the world and how their lives would be impacted by, say, an invasion of Taiwan, for example, or the Ukraine war metastasizing into a wider conflict, or a hostile submarine shutting down a major strategic trade route. And the government, all governments, providing cogent and well reasoned defence policies, including addressing industries and procurement, to voters.

Just why does Canada need an RCN frigate in the Mediterranean, and what does that cost to develop, build, train, and deploy, as well as have a follow on capability in development?

Just why does the CAF deploy to Kuwait and what are the real costs of developing a strategic airlift capability to support that mission?

Just why do CP140's, RCN ships and submarines operate in the east China sea from time to time?

And asking these questions when in reality the development of these capabilities takes decades and decades across multiple governments is really the key - are we willing to play politics with defence procurement like Jean Chretien cancelling massive helicopter contracts to win a majority government?

The CAF must be funded appropriately in the near term, and must institute some urgent corrective measures on, say, personnel, right now. Because if there's no people, there's no defence. But Canadians should also ask them selves some hard questions, and hold their elected representatives, across all levels of government, accountable for a cogent and integrated defence policy, including climate change, recognizing where the CAF has been, and what the elected representatives need to do to generate a positive CAF future for all Canadians.