The case for the Boeing P8 - a replacement for the RCAF's CP140 Aurora

Hello dear readers. If you made it this far, welcome!

So for those that know me from my career, or my various internet ramblings, mostly on @pbontoast1, I am a proponent of the P8 Poseidon as a replacement to the quickly ageing Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CP140 Aurora. Why? Follow on.

First, I make no claim to be THE expert in military operations, procurement, policy, economics, or whatever else. I am what I am, just a private citizen now with some experience that might be relevant, and a perspective that may be worth something. You decide. I also prefer not to blast a long list of credentials that might be relevant, though I can provide you a CV by other means if you wish. 

I prefer to stand on logic and truth, not by "you must believe me because I say so earnestly and with firm hand gestures, and here are all my post-nomials", which I desperately dislike from the retired senior officer crowd in particular.

What I'll cover in this piece is the case for Canada purchasing the P8 Poseidon. There's any number of ways to approach this issue - economics and price, availability, capability, requirements, interoperability, and so forth. Many of these I'll talk about. But I want to back up and start with an approach that is honestly forgotten in many conversations about the CP140 and the P8, and that's what this capability has provided for Canadians, and what it should provide for Canadians in the future. All too often a cloud of secrecy shades or hides what this capability does and why it is so vital for Canadians. If voters and taxpayers never see the results of this labour, how will they ever know what these people and aircraft do?

So, in this spirit and in the style of story telling - a style which resonates with everyone, not just defence, Air Force, academics, or policy makers, lets continue.

In 1993 a CP140 was continuously deployed to Sicily with warshot torpedoes for NATO Operation SHARP GUARD. The only deployment of a CP140 with live weapons, this operation was designed to enforce the arms embargo of Serbia and also to protect the various naval vessels deployed to the Adriatic from a submarine threat. The operation continued for a year and then was extended for another year without weapons. A solid contribution to stability in the region.

On 22 February, 1994 a ship was seized by HMCS Terra Nova of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in international waters east of Nova Scotia. That ship, the Motor Vessel (MV) Pacifico, was eventually found to have transported more than 5 tons of cocaine to Canada. Central to the published story was Terra Nova and her boarding party as well as the legal arguments required to seize a ship in international waters. Not well known is the role surveillance played in the take down, from international intelligence gathering to identify the shipment, to the police, to tracking the shipment from it's origin, to the take down. A vital part of the take down was evidence that the MV Pacifico was truly involved in smuggling drugs into Canada, and especially since she remained in international waters for her entire voyage, never entering Canadian waters. What happened was those that were watching the ship witnessed a second small vessel rendezvous with the Pacifico, remain alongside for a period of time, then return to a Canadian port thereby establishing a link to Canadian soil. In the doctrine of hot pursuit the Terra Nova was then authorized to stop and seize the Pacifico as it fled away from Canada. The smaller vessel was also seized at the Canadian port by police. While a number of sensors were watching events unfold, a CP140 Aurora was at the center of the evidence required for the arrests. A massive drug bust and solid contribution to Canadian security.

On 9/10 December 1994 the MV Salvador Allende foundered and sank in a storm 1200 nautical miles east of the US. This was an extreme distance for any land based search and rescue assets to get to, let alone rescue anyone in life rafts or adrift. As part of a huge effort between passing vessels who aided the search, US Coast Guard, US Air National Guard, US Marines and RCAF C130 and CP140 aircraft the scene was searched and a few survivors plucked from the ocean by long range air to air refueled helicopters. The CP140 with it's range, endurance, crew, communications suite and sensors was an ideal platform to coordinate the search efforts of multiple ships and aircraft that arrived on scene. Without that coordination, the search would not be effective, and multiple CP140 missions flew on the rescue - in the end, the RCAF flew 15 missions to the limits of their endurance in terrible weather, accumulating more than 150 flight hours. https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/10/nyregion/atlantic-storm-casts-31-adrift-as-ship-sinks.html

On 13 November 1998 the RCAF tasked a crew from 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia to support the Department of Fisheries and Oceans by carrying a Fisheries Officer and conducting surveillance of the fishing fleets on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The crew flew from Greenwood to St John's, Nfld to pick up the fisheries officer, then flew the surveillance mission at low level over fishing fleets covering most of the Grand Banks fishing fleets, most outside but very near Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles off shore in that area. This type of presence and surveillance sends a message to fishing fleets that Canada is interested and watching, reducing over fishing and violations of fishing bans. The crew flew for more than 10 hours that day and again the range and endurance of the large aircraft along with its sensors and crew makes this mission possible, and also impossible for smaller lighter aircraft.

In March 1998 a CP140 crew deployed to Andoya, Norway to fly 50 hours over several weeks in support of a large NATO maritime exercise in the Norwegian Sea. The capability to quickly deploy and integrate with a large NATO force in a wartime scenario exercise is critical for Canada's support to NATO and its allies. No other aircraft could deploy this quickly, at that distance, and integrate with a NATO maritime force so quickly in a wartime scenario.

Currently CP140 Auroras and the RCN routinely deploy to Asia under Operation NEON, consisting of maritime surveillance in support of UN sanctions. Again, deploying at such a distance from Canada requires logistical support - parts, expertise etc which no other capability could achieve at such a distance from Canada and complete the surveillance mission. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html

And so on. And I haven't even talked about some of the larger wartime missions like Operation IMPACT, or Operation SIRIUS, or Operation APOLLO - I'm sure my colleagues can tell considerable stories about those deployments.

These missions and stories could not be told without a long range, large aircraft with sufficient crew, sensor and weapons, properly supported in distant deployment locations, and an ability to integrate with other forces.

The question now is what can replace the rapidly ageing CP140 and its crew, sensors and weapons if we value these missions as Canadians?

Well.

I want to cut to the chase quite quickly and state that no aircraft other than the P8 Poseidon can carry the weapons and sensors needed for these missions. Just in two critical areas alone - to carry the weight of the stores and weapons, and to generate the power required to energize the communications and mission equipment is quite difficult and near impossible for smaller aircraft. Let's explore these two areas.

On electrical power, it becomes very clear when engineers calculate the kVa (kilovolt-amps, a typical measure of the power of an electrical system) required to run concurrently the sensors, flight systems, navigation, and communication systems required for the missions above that smaller aircraft will have severe deficiencies and large trade offs, or be completely incapable of generating the required power to do the mission.

On weapons. The primary weapon of the CP140 and P8 Poseidon is the light weight Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) torpedo, though both aircraft could carry a wide range of weapons for other missions. Lightweight torpedoes are fire and forget weapons that have their own active sonar in the nose. Drop the weapon in a good position, the torpedo finds and neutralizes its target independently. Lightweight torpedoes have a lot going on under the hood - an active sonar in the nose, electronics, propulsion, and stabilizing parachutes. This means that current and capable light weight torpedoes require a heated bomb bay to protect the weapon from the extreme elements of long range aviation. Could lightweight torpedoes be carried under the wings? Not in their current design, no, but of course a new weapon could be developed to do so - it would take a significant engineering and test effort however.

Only one aircraft is suitable for the power generation and bomb bay capabilities required - the P8 Poseidon. I will concede I know little about the Japanese P1 currently flying with Japanese forces, other than it has not been seriously offered for sale outside of Japan, and doesn't seem fully operational yet, even after twenty years of development. An analysis of the required interoperability with NATO and Canada's allies would likely uncover deficiencies in communication systems, sensors and the like which would seriously degrade the performance of the P1 in missions that Canada values with its partners.

On these two aspects alone - electrical power and weapons, the P8 Poseidon is the sole aircraft that can meet the missions stated for the Canadian Multi Mission Aircraft requirement http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2016/aerospace-systems-57.page

Don't get me wrong - I'm not a Boeing shill. I would much prefer, as would most of my colleagues I'm sure, a four engine turbo prop aircraft. Most of us were skeptical of the 737 as a basis for a new long range patrol aircraft simply because it could not operate as freely as the P3/CP140 at low levels over water, typically below 1000 feet while on station. Conducting anti submarine warfare requires the accuracy and precision gained by being much closer to your target - low level. Operating two high bypass turbo fan engines at low level where they are less efficient (turbo props become more efficient at lower levels due to the density of air) and subject to corrosion from salt air and at risk of ingesting birds has always been and will continue to be an issue with the P8. In addition the P8 is simply a much larger wing than the P3/CP140 making it less maneuverable, a trait much less desirable while tracking very quick and stealthy submarines. Many of us suffered significant turbulence and G forces while chasing very quick submarines in stiff winged P3/CP140s - the P8 is likely less capable in this area, and advances in sensors will offset this trait to some degree, but the bottom line is a lightweight torpedo must be placed very accurately, at low level, to have any chance of finding and attacking its target before fuel starvation.

Of course there are many other aspects to the P8 that could be discussed and I may add to this article in the future. But for me the bottom line is the missions that Canadians value must continue, and the only aircraft available that meets our requirements is the P8 Poseidon.

Canadian Armed Forces Defence Review - Back to the Future

This from a retired officer just musing in to the wind. If I have something to contribute, I might as well - it's free and I've lived under many successive Canadian government's defence (in)decisions. Play along if you wish. Thanks for getting this far if you don't.

First, I joined the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1987 as a Direct Entry Officer Air Navigator at the age of 25. I like to think of myself as a little more worldly than my peers, some who were direct out of high school and 18 years old, or others direct out of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) where one could argue well rounded worldly perspectives might not have been on offer, though not unavailable.

I was also the product of a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) officer who joined in 1959 and followed the non-degreed path through what would now be called a Naval academy at HMCS Venture - a single year as a naval cadet. My father went through unification in the late '60s and I remember to this day his anger at arriving at an exchange posting with the US Navy in Army green with the rank of Major.

My career featured some wide experiences - 15 years of CP140 Aurora operations and leadership across the western hemisphere, sailing on a submarine, evaluating NATO PfP nations for their readiness, serving in three Naval headquarters, planning and executing expeditionary operations and logistics, serving overseas, serving as a planner and leader at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), and many more. So with the backdrop of a military brat, unification, the 1987 Defence White paper, not wearing uniforms off base due to the public's dim view of the military after the Somalia scandal, a wide range of military operational experiences, and finally some fairly robust contact with Professional Military Education (PME) and national security academia I come to you with some opinions about Canada's national defence policy, on the cusp of another review.

First, where have we been? And second, what should the foundation of a defence review be? From these two questions we could possibly build a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) fit for Canadian purpose in the world, because at heart I believe Canadians want a CAF that resonates with them, not a pure warfighting machine designed as an expeditionary conqueror.

Where have we been? In my humble opinion many CAF issues today have roots in unification. Not that I believe unification was necessarily bad, but I do believe unification was done simply as a force efficiency measure - consolidate the essential functions of administration and logistics into one organization instead of the previous three separate Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), RCN and Canadian Army (CA) support organizations. But what I do believe is unification, some would say simply because of the standardized army green uniforms and ranks across the entire force no matter what the function, created a generation of soldiers, sailors and aviators who lacked identity - and were angry about it. As a remedy, the current initiatives to go back to pips and crowns, and Naval ranks are a small measure to find an identity.

Where have we been in force structure? Well, in the past, as an example, the RCN featured a blue water Navy of an aircraft carrier, submarines, aviation, frigates, destroyers, minesweepers - a comprehensive force of the capabilities needed for blue water and expeditionary operations with the aim of local sea control when needed. Truly the vision of what a post WW2 Navy should be according to Naval minds. What has changed are year adjusted budgets, the peace dividend, and the doctrine of multi-purpose platforms (simply in the name of efficiency and cost savings?) - but the RCN thinking and doctrine is essentially unchanged - they just have to get by with multi purpose platforms now, and support allies as best they can due to their force available.

Similarly in the RCAF, and as another example as a supporting commander to CA operations, the force structure included light reconnaissance, heavy transport, and robust tactical maneuver helicopters (Kiowa, Chinook, single/twin Hueys), designed for robust land operations. In my view CA air operational doctrine has not changed, but what has changed is the removal of those platforms, and their replacement with a small, light, and not so Army capable Griffon. Why? Cost savings and efficiency? The results of those decisions, and unchanging doctrine resulted in much wringing of hands, and arguably deaths in Afghanistan as Canada begged, borrowed, and contracted helicopter support for their extremely challenging land operations. Air Task Force Mali? All about helicopters. Similar to the RCN, basic land doctrine, in my view, was essentially unchanged, but money and efficiency ruled force structure. 

Of course I would be remiss by not mentioning the CA's lack of anti-air, anti-tank, and air ISR and attack capabilities that might bring it to a more capable land force able to operate without major allies, but those capabilities have never seriously been fielded or considered for the CA - another discussion for the more learned Army officers amongst us.

In the RCN, the surface force has been reduced to multi-purpose frigates - not particularly good at any one thing, but modestly capable at some things, some used diesel electric submarines, and some minor vessels good for projecting a flag. The RCN still uses Mahanian doctrines of sea power and control - they project frigates in what one could argue is some sort of gun boat diplomacy. They use freedom of navigation doctrines, and they articulate (though don't really demonstrate with much influence) weaponized operations. But it's a narrow and shallow RCN - a few frigates, aviation assets (the maritime helicopter arguably a frigate's most important asset) struggling for operational readiness after successive government failures on the file, non weaponized coastal vessels, and few old diesel electric submarines capable of only sporadic expeditionary ops.

As successive Generals built the modern RCAF - some cold warriors, some with US Air Force doctrine on their brains. some with only fighter or transport or land helicopter experience, those successive Generals made the decision to have all aviation assets in the CAF wear an RCAF uniform. The result is an RCAF that does not stand on its own - the RCAF is mostly a supporting organization to the CA and RCN. It is rare that the RCAF conducts domestic or expeditionary operations itself - the RCAF, in CAF terms, is a supporting Commander.

This RCAF posture, along with the RCAF's imported USAF Command and Control doctrine of centralized Command and decentralized execution, leaves the RCAF somewhat confused most days. For example, in the RCAF there is almost never a day without a conversation on Command and Control (C2) - who is the commander, who owns decisions, and at what level? - symptoms of a lack of understanding, not just in the RCAF, but CAF wide, of what the RCAF is and what it does.

With the backdrop of unification, the doctrinal and force structure realities of the CAF, the CAF "fought" the Cold War. There was a common enemy, and there was an objective. It was hardly a Cold War - it was very hot at times, but the CAF had a purpose.

Enter Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev and the peace dividend. A quote from the World Bank is instructive: 

"the key policy implication of this study is straightforward: The Peace Dividend 

from military spending cuts is likely to be very substantial over the longer term. 

Thus reductions in military spending should be viewed as attractive structural 

policy elements of macroeconomic packages designed to enhance the growth 

path of capacity output." 

World Bank - POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1577, The Peace Dividend Military Spending Cuts and Economic Growth, Feb 1996

If one cuts through the economic blurb, you can see the pressure governments were under to cut defence spending after the Cold War. And they did. Without citing a bunch of policy, budgets and whatnot, essentially this is what happened between 1960 and 2000 to Western defence budgets:

Now I am hardly an economist, or a politician, but I did live in a military that was faced with these real budget cuts, and experienced daily the hand wringing that happened at all levels (do we buy paper and pens this month, or send a crew away for training?). Those that understood threats existed still, and witnessed very real programme cancellations, delays, and denials due to this Peace Dividend were justifiably frustrated - but cuts continued, and arguably continue to have an effect (like, say, the Force Reduction Programme where thousands of CAF members were given money to leave in the mid-90s, leaving demographic holes that existed until only recently), on politician's decisions (why do we need to spend money? Spending won't get me a vote), on CAF members and on Canada at large.

So, exiting the Cold War and dealing with large defence budget cuts along with the backdrop of unchanged doctrines and unification leaves the CAF in it's situation today - under resourced, partially adrift as doctrines don't match force structure, and in inconclusive operations like Mali, NORAD, the South China Sea and many others. And now, climate change.

Yes, climate change is real. Yes the CAF will be called to help Canadians, likely more in the future. The CAF must respond - how the government resources the CAF to respond is the key issue. Does the Federal government hold provincial governments to account for their clearly provincial responsibilities? Or does the federal government, fund a new domestic response capability for the CAF? I am far from an expert, though I have worked disaster response and been in several provincial disaster scenarios as an advisor. What I would say is there's a huge opportunity to create Reserve Force jobs in local and regional areas of Canada specifically for these tasks. Suffice it to say, tasks to support to Canadians in domestic emergencies will likely continue to grow for the CAF.

And a current dire situation in the CAF is personnel. Culture change, pay, housing, benefits are just some of the personnel pressures on the CAF right now. there is a dire need for professional strategic human resources, and also dollars direct in to CAF member's pockets to incentivize them to join and stay.

Where do we go from here? The backdrop of unification, the Cold War and subsequent peace dividend, the repeated starving of the CAF of resources and capabilities while in parallel neither the CAF nor the government has articulated any change in doctrinal roles, defence procurement disasters and questions like NATO's 2% of GDP doctrine, and rust out, and now climate change.

I do not have the answer. I do know that much of the near term could be addressed by Steve Saideman's latest precis here https://saideman.blogspot.com/2023/07/my-dream-defence-policy-update.html

But I also believe Canadians would do themselves a great service by engagement on defence, showing an understanding of the dangers of the world and how their lives would be impacted by, say, an invasion of Taiwan, for example, or the Ukraine war metastasizing into a wider conflict, or a hostile submarine shutting down a major strategic trade route. And the government, all governments, providing cogent and well reasoned defence policies, including addressing industries and procurement, to voters.

Just why does Canada need an RCN frigate in the Mediterranean, and what does that cost to develop, build, train, and deploy, as well as have a follow on capability in development?

Just why does the CAF deploy to Kuwait and what are the real costs of developing a strategic airlift capability to support that mission?

Just why do CP140's, RCN ships and submarines operate in the east China sea from time to time?

And asking these questions when in reality the development of these capabilities takes decades and decades across multiple governments is really the key - are we willing to play politics with defence procurement like Jean Chretien cancelling massive helicopter contracts to win a majority government?

The CAF must be funded appropriately in the near term, and must institute some urgent corrective measures on, say, personnel, right now. Because if there's no people, there's no defence. But Canadians should also ask them selves some hard questions, and hold their elected representatives, across all levels of government, accountable for a cogent and integrated defence policy, including climate change, recognizing where the CAF has been, and what the elected representatives need to do to generate a positive CAF future for all Canadians.

The Royal Military College of Canada – Scandal, Issues, and a Proposal

The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) has come under scrutiny for scandal and lack of leadership. Problematic leadership and students have made the news for many years. And so, I have a proposal. A proposal for change, and a proposal that may address problematic RMC results. Mme Arbour states that RMC (and its sister Collège militaire royale de Saint-Jean), are rife with a culture of hyper masculinity and sexual misconduct. She argues for a potential massive change in fixing these schools. And so, what to do?

Outline

Introduction
Caveats and Disclaimers
Conceptual level
Diversity - Entry plans, gender, race, age, experience, elitism
Four pillars of RMC – Academics, Physical fitness, Bilingualism, Military
RMC Staff composition
Other Issues
Initiate Change
Summary
About the Author

Introduction

First, we can’t solve a problem if we don’t know clearly what the problem is. And second, the problem is likely complex. As Michael Power of the London School of Economics says, a boundary preserving problem solving model such as a process rather than a boundary expanding model that realizes the complexity and interconnectedness of the world is key. In other words, sit back and throw a few quick fixes at RMC within the CAF’s current model and we’ll likely not make substantive change. Realize that the model itself likely needs change due to the complex nature of the CAF, and we may get somewhere.

I propose comprehensive reform.

So, what is the RMC problem?

We’ve all seen the stories and incidents at RMC, mostly in the news. Some of us have firsthand experience with RMC, whether as a student or staff member. Many of us have interacted with RMC graduates or with the institution itself. We all have our stories and a narrative in our heads. And through this paper I’ll also submit some firsthand stories from life at RMC that will help to build a narrative. But as Power suggests, bounding a problem definition to just RMC would be foolish - we also must consider the wider CAF and recognize the complexity of the issues we wish to tackle.

What I propose as a problem definition is leadership.

Leadership. Leadership is a broad topic, but a topic that is at the core of the CAF officer ethos. As Charlotte Duval-Lantoine rightly argues when assessing the CAF responses to gender integration and sexual misconduct in her new book The Ones We Let Down, “Toxic leadership is at the roots of CF leaders’ inability to perform their duties and responsibilities”. The CAF has abundant leadership doctrine and studies. But the CAF, and specifically the officer corps, has demonstrated that it has been unable to lead itself through its scandals despite its branding itself the profession of arms.

As we move through this proposal, the connections and complexities of the CAF will become evident (if the reader doesn’t already agree). I will explore the connection of RMC to the institution in several ways. But tracing back to the core issue, the core problem of leadership, will be important to ground the discourse. Because if we don’t know the problem, we can’t solve it.

Caveats and Disclaimers

First. I’m no “expert”. Many will have issues with what I and others are about to propose to you. There will be barriers and arguments against my proposals. There will be disagreement in part or even in whole with what I present. But RMC is a construct that was deliberately put in place. Many of its issues, both public and private, are features not bugs. But it can be modified in part or in whole by the institution. There is no real barrier to progress, only process and resource barriers constructed by the institution itself. There is no excuse.

Second, I report to no one. I am simply a private citizen with a ground game knowledge of how the institution works in the areas I’ve had access to, gained from my perspectives, jobs, interactions, and duties. I do not claim to be omniscient, nor an expert at any one aspect of my proposals. I am a generalist, but with experience.

Third, I mean no ill will to any leader or organization. I have no agenda other than to offer my thoughts to the betterment of the CAF. My proposal may be timely with the current reconstitution directives, but I’ve not linked this proposal to any official process or person. I am open to debate on any issue I present, but I am also confident that through my previous consultations and debates these proposals have at least some merits.

Fourth, I have consulted reasonably widely with current and former CAF members, and others. Some may be identified, and others will remain anonymous for their own personal reasons. This is not a work done in isolation, though I have been selective at times with my consultations, preferring open and independent dialogue rather than dialogue with individuals that have vested interests in various areas.

Conceptual Level

So, I'll start with the conceptual level of leadership in the officer corps – development.

We have a well-established Officer Professional Development Framework (OPDF). But, like military justice and administrative discipline, its only effective if the CAF uses it properly. I'd argue the CAF has drifted away from the OPDF framework at points, and now we're seeing some results. I’ll not spend time defining what is readily available, so suffice it to say the Professional Development for Officers can be found here [1].

The Developmental Periods (DPs) are a reasonably good frame for this discussion. The DPs illustrate institutional and individual responsibilities throughout an officer’s career. I do not have issues with these DPs and their definitions, though some may, I have issues with how the DPs are managed and by whom. Going back to leadership as the core problem, leadership by the CAF and its responsible officers and agencies through the DP process must be examined.

In one example DP 2 was delegated to the services some time ago. The services do DP 2 well (CA through Fort Frontenac), are getting there (RCAF through the Air Warfare Centre), or not much at all (RCN, though this may change with the reconstitution of HMCS Venture. We will see). The DP 2 level of knowledge is extremely inconsistent when members show up at the front door at CFC for DP 3. Some have never been out of their service at the tactical level and have little CAF-wide knowledge. In fact, the old OPDP exams (cancelled some time ago) imparted balanced and consistent training and education on CAF wide issues to all CAF officers, albeit in a challenging paper and snail mail modality.

So, conceptually, we can be much better at managing the OPDF from an institutional perspective rather than a service perspective, and specifically ensuring Professional Military Education (PME) in DP 1 and 2 are consistent with the CAF’s competencies and values, even though we have a good framework.

Diversity

Diversity will be our strength - if we recognize it. So, much more diverse entry plans for officers, much more diverse degrees, much more diverse representation of genders, of all Canadians must be examined and potentially implemented. Example: it is proposed that the percentage of officer candidates graduating from RMC be reduced, and other entry plans be increased.

“RMC never felt to me like the preeminent source for leaders in the CAF. It was but one source. DEOs, in my experience, presented with the most evenly keeled leadership primarily due to their level of maturity when entering the CAF” Major (retired) Charity Weedon.

This proposal would diversify the officer corps in several ways if managed well.

First, the percentage of RMC graduates versus every other officer entry plan should be reduced to allow for more influence by non-RMC grads. In fact there is little evidence, other than the exclusive club-like feel and networking of RMC graduates experience, that RMC officers are better leaders than non-RMC officers.

“I see a lot of TDV [truth, duty valour] in social media responses to crises at RMC” [indicating the club-like atmosphere of RMC graduates], Weedon says

“…I also found little proof for the widely accepted premise that the military colleges produced better officer candidates.”[2] Commander (retired) Ken Hansen

Second, if the degree selections of the officer corps were managed in a way to broaden the officer corps’ degrees, away from linear thinking STEM graduates, and towards a higher percentage of liberal arts, I argue that this would necessarily increase the possibility of critical thinking through a diversity of opinions and decrease the officer corps tendency to be comfortable in liner thinking.

A criticism that Dr Adam Chapnick of the CFC would have of moving away from STEM would be there is little evidence that STEM graduates have less ability for critical thinking. I partially agree with Dr Chapnick (though he is by far a more learned expert than I). I believe there is a structural bias towards male dominated STEM fields being the superior choice for students (one only must look to the sister institution in Kingston, ON – Queens to see that notion in action. In my opinion Queens Engineering is a case study in the superior choice for students). So in my unscientific opinion, and in the case of STEM being the superior choice and gendered towards male students, I believe there is a problematic bias and the potential for a serious lack of diversity of thought.

I believe this argument is supported by the increased appetite for design thinking [3] at DP 3 and 4. The toolbox of the CAF Operational Planning Process (OPP), and systems thinking with Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop overlays most certainly has come under heavy criticism for shallow and linear thinking. Having an officer with a Philosophy degree at the table is something quite different than having an officer with a civil engineering degree when thinking models are compared.

These diversity proposals require leadership. It is of no use to implement one of these proposals and not lead the institution through a transformation. Increasing diversity in entry plans, degrees, gender and other traits will take effort and leadership through possibly an entire generation of cadets before increased diversity is accepted as the norm.

RMC Pillars

The OPDF is a conceptual framework that all officers are subject to. The framework is managed by Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) on behalf of the Commander Military Personnel Command (Comd MPC). Essentially it is a cascading architecture starting with the CAF Values of integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship, and excellence on which organizational and functional competencies are nested. RMC’s pillars are a small subset of the OPDF at DP 1 and are academic, bilingualism, athletics, and military.

Academic

The academic pillar is the undergraduate degree the cadet pursues while at RMC. The cadet follows the curriculum of the degree they’ve been assigned or chosen, and the professors are mostly federal public servants, though with collectively bargained academic freedom. RMC offers post graduate studies up to the PhD level which are offered to mature officers and civilians. It is notable that the academic staff at RMC holds no real leadership role over cadets.

Bilingualism

Cadets must study a second official language if they are not bilingual in French and English. While this may be problematic for cadet’s study and other time commitments at RMC, it is a Federally mandated programme. Officers must have certain levels of second language capability to advance in their careers after RMC.

Athletics

“At least RMC doesn’t have a cheerleading squad”

 

“Recruit term traditions were male focused with thinly veiled attempt to adapt to females at the college”

 

“Frat style games…boys will be boys…. We [women] stood to the side”

RMC has a comprehensive athletics programme. However, the programme is heavily biased towards male dominated teams such as ice hockey and rugby. Diversity in activities at RMC will also be required and this will also take leadership to develop.

Military

“Where are the adults?” a female ex cadet.

 

“First and most important lesson learned: ladies, lock your doors” a female ex cadet

The military staff leading cadets at RMC is very small and former staff have reported a lack of capacity for appropriate supervision and control. This deficiency must be addressed by a multi layer approach.  First, a revised DP 1 competency-based framework would do well to adjust the military pillar away from marching and basic skills towards a values and competency based programme. A draft competency based framework developed as part of an officer specification review is presented below at Figure 1 as a pictorial example, though the recent publication of The CAF Ethos: Trusted to Serve [4] is a comprehensive document. The construction of a military pillar with these frameworks as their foundation would ensure that the pillar would effectively do as much DP 1 as possible before evaluation for graduation as a commissioned officer.

Figure 1 - A draft competency-based framework

In addition to these comments on the RMC pillars a sense of priority of the pillars must be given. If no priority is given the pillars may well become out of balance across the college – some will value athletics over academics, others the reverse. So, a priority designed to harmonize staff and student efforts alike might look like this: 

1) CAF values (the base of the competency base framework)

2) Academic Achievement

3) Bilingualism

4) DP 1 studies - Introduction to Military Life/Military Trades

5) Military Administration

6) Physical Fitness training and leading PT

7) Athletics

RMC Military Staff Composition

Second, a revised military staffing and structure is desperately needed and a proposed composition and structure is presented next. Staff must represent the best of the CAF to ensure proper mentorship and “what looks like right” to the cadets. To achieve this:

1) Staff must represent all CAF services and trades – Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and trades that serve all services such as logistics and engineers.

2) Staff must all be top third in their rank/trade

3) Staff must all be screened for toxic leadership/sociopathic tendencies, etc.

4) Staff must include appropriate bilingualism 

5) Staff must have all led people

6) Only 50% should be RMC grads

7) A minimum of 70% of staff must be women and visible minorities

8) Consideration for Regular and Reserve Force visiting academics on the military staff

From these basic requirements, we now look at the daily military leadership structure and then try to establish this structure on the requirement to mentor our future graduates. Thus, I would tend to structure the cadet leadership cadre as follows:

Commandant - BGen

Director Cadets - Col

Division Commanders - LCol (Post-Command)

Squadron Commanders - Majors (Post-Command)

Flight Commanders - Captains (Post-DP2)

Section Commanders for 4th Years - UTPNCM Candidates

Section Commanders for 3rd Years - Selected Sr NCOs

Section Commanders for 2nd Years - Selected Captains (non-DP2)

Section Commanders for 1st Years - Selected Sr NCOs

So how would the CAF fill staff positions at RMC? The links from RMC to the CAF are important here. The CAF is routinely at 60% effectively bodies in seats. High readiness deployable units and structures are of course filled – a ship cannot sail with 60% of its crew. But the lack of effectively trained personnel puts limits on the personnel available for staffs. Placing a demand on the CAF to fill positions at RMC with the above proposal would receive serious push back from commanders reticent to lose their best members. To counter the inevitable push back first, and secondly to incentivize members to want to be posted away from their career stream to RMC, measures must be put in place such as promotion board points equivalent to a deployment or a command, and a percentage (a selected 5% of RMC and NCO graduates may be an appropriate target) to remain on staff each year, which continuously feeds the staff with capable and knowledgeable members. In fact, I argue that operations can be conducted by the average officer quite competently. Where you want your best officers is in education and training.

Other Issues

In addition to the proposals above, RMC should deliver DP 1, and DP 2 level PME at RMC via hybrid virtual and residential programmes. If implemented, the CAF will ensure all officers (including Regular Force, Reserve Force and potentially Cadet Instructor Cadre) have contact with RMC and deliver robust CAF level PME. This proposal would have multiple effects: standardizing the officer that leaves DP 2, ensuring we look all officers in the eye before they move to DP 3, and adding the networking component that DP 2 officers that never leave their service until DP 3 do not have. This proposal meshes with the idea that the RMC cadet population be reduced to allow for more diverse entry plans which in turn reduces the cadet population and makes physical and intellectual space for a more robust PME education delivery.

Mme Arbour’s proposal to move towards a UK “Sandhurst model” of a years long non degreed military academy must be addressed. As this author has stated elsewhere [5] the academic capabilities of RMC are great value to Canada’s research and thinking in national defence and international affairs. Losing that academic function by transforming RMC into a non-degreed military academy would be a loss for the wider national security apparatus in Canada as some of the leading independent thinkers in this space in Canada are RMC academics.

Initiate Change

Risk case

There is risk in this proposal. I have written extensively on risk in the past [6], and in general I believe that the CAF does not handle risk well. And in that weakness is a lack of leadership again. Given the plethora of issues surrounding RMC, a risk approach with appropriate analysis must be adopted.

Leadership

As proposed the core issue I’ve identified is leadership. The barriers to progress at RMC are none in my view. The problematic results of RMC can be changed. It will take leadership.

Accountability

Finally, the issues surrounding RMC have less chance of correction without accountability. The issues surrounding RMC appear to be endemic and have occurred over a long period of time, with no visible accountability mechanism. Too often in the CAF very senior leaders move on and are never held accountable for any failures on their watch.

Summary

In summary, my proposal retains RMC but transitions CAF officer entry programmes to less RMC degreed officers and more diverse non-RMC degrees for the academic pillar which would increase the diversity of officers entering the CAF. I propose increasing CAF level PME delivered virtually and at RMC in DP 1 and 2 specifically, a staff transformation, and hard power by incentivizing RMC postings by promotion board points and by retaining a select 5% of students as staff (at CFC the math worked out to refreshing the entire staff over 5 years give a standard 3 year posting). The PME delivered should be competency based. The RMC itself must change its staff structure to include more supervision and higher achieving officers and NCOs through incentives to attract top talent.

Thus, a transformation of RMC into a more PME focused institution, harmonizing the early development of officers, but also diversifying the officer corps could be achieved.

What follows must be leadership of the transformation and not just boundary preserving fixes. Leadership will provide an example for all officers to emulate, and it will nurture these ongoing efforts at RMC change and tied to leadership must also be an accountability framework.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Chris Bowen served as an Air Navigator and later Air Combat Systems Officer for 35 years in air operations, flight testing, Canadian, NATO and coalition staffs, training, and education roles. He received a Bachelor of Arts as a civilian and entered the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) under the Direct Entry Officer (DEO) plan. He went on to graduate from the University of Nottingham with a Master of Science, and the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) with a Master of Defence Studies. He retired in 2022 from the Canadian Forces College (CFC).

[1] https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education-training/professional-development/framework/officers.html

[2] https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-reforms-to-canadas-ineffective-royal-military-colleges-are-long/

[3] https://aodnetwork.ca/

[4] https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-ethos-trusted-to-serve.html

[5] Patrick Cain, ipolitics.ca, https://www.ipolitics.ca/news/would-reforming-canadas-military-colleges-help-cadets-grow-into-better-officers

[6] Taming The Leviathan - A New Approach To Risk For The Military Leader,  Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. E. Bowen 28 August 2012, Canadian Forces College, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/303/171/171-eng.html?search_where=title&keywords=leviathan&programLimit=all&yearLimit=all&submit=Search

My opinions on Mr Maisonneuve's Vimy Gala speech

    The recent speech by Mr. Maisonneuve at the Vimy Gala dinner made me cringe. The mere use of the words "woke", mainstream media bias, and cancel culture normally make me turn away, block, or just ignore any message the author may have. But this was different. Here was a very senior and decorated retired officer taking a national spotlight to push his political agenda.

    Mr. Maisonneuve made a deliberate choice to use these words, and chose to send his message with the invitation to a prestigious gala, and the award of the Vimy prize. He chose this quasi-military (and attended by uniformed military members) platform to push a political message while using his former rank and his medals as a backdrop. There could be no more clear message - he chose to use his military service to advocate right wing political tropes mainstreamed by the political far right. "I believe we can be great again", said Maisonneuve. Where have we heard that before?

    As we learned more about his speech - from those in attendance, and from various excerpts, the message became more clear. He positioned himself very near those that may fly a flag with vulgar statements about the current government. Make no mistake, Mr Maisonneuve positioned himself as anti-Trudeau/Liberal government.

    This is anti-government rhetoric, couched in anti-media and "cancel culture" terms - ostensibly because his world view is more white male privileged "conservative". He advocates for the days of short haircuts, uniform uniforms, and service before self. He argues that the woke Liberal government has pushed a selfish me culture on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and he claims, without evidence, this culture will erode operational effectiveness. In addition, he argues, unpersuasively, that Canadian youth don't have the same drive for selfless service - Back to the Future's Vice Principle Strickland comes immediately to mind.

    In one of Maisonneuve's more inflammatory statements, he argues "The idea, the concept of service seems to be forgotten in our “me-first” culture. Service to others, to one’s country, to humanity must be a noble aspiration. The obligation to give back in gratitude for a life filled with blessings, peace and good fortune should not be innovative. It seems that Canadians have lost the desire to serve and the need to serve their country." 

    I can think of no more offensive thing to say to Canadian people. I'm not sure about you, but everywhere I look, I see service. I see people grinding out shifts in hospitals over run by respiratory diseases. I see volunteers in community sports. I see Cadets. I see advocates. I see frustration with the past and those that want to roll back time. And by his words, I see his arrogance - he alone has the virtues, not normal Canadians.

    Maisonneuve laments leadership failures, and lack of personal accountability. Yet, nowhere does he mention he was part of the CAF culture problem, buddies with now disgraced General and Flag officers (GOFOs), a senior officer in the CAF where people were bullied, harassed and assaulted by powerful men. Nowhere does he mention he had the power to fix the CAF culture in his time. On his watch Macleans publish a seminal article on rape in the Canadian Forces https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/rape-in-the-military/. On his watch, the Canadian Airborne Regiment killed a Somali teenager. He knew the Canadian Armed Forces had issues, as did we all. He apparently did nothing. Yet he says this: "Today’s world is also where taking personal responsibility for our own actions has disappeared from the landscape while the phenomenon of collective apologies flourishes in our country. Individuals and groups fight over who gets to wear the coveted victim’s cloak." Victim's cloak indeed.

    In my time in the CAF I worked for and with many very senior officers. I had access to many GOFOs. I heard many speak, and interacted with many more Canadian and foreign officers. In addition, I had access to very senior non-military national leaders. And let me tell you, many senior non-military leaders had opinions on CAF senior leadership that were not so kind. In one case I overheard a very senior government official deride CAF leadership as arrogant and over reaching. My opinions on CAF GOFOs vary, but there is indeed a non-zero amount of GOFOs I would never interact with due to hubris or arrogance or incompetence.

    Here's the thing. In my opinion general officers have three roles: when asked, provide non-partisan military advice to government, force generate a capable Canadian Armed Forces for the tasks assigned by government, and when ordered by the government, go to war. In my opinion where GOFOs begin to fail is when they enter the political sphere. When they publish opinions on the current government. When they attempt to hide issues, or manipulate politicians. When they use their almost uncontested power within the CAF for their own purposes.

    And so, great leaders are accountable for their actions and responsible for their words. Thus, entry into the political realm as a GOFO is fraught with personal danger. 

    And then, he doubles down. Maisonneuve publishes an editorial in the National Post "Clearing the air about my anti-woke speech". And let me tell you, the victim vibe is heavy. The right wing virtue signaling is clear. And the lack of responsibility and accountability over heavy criticism of his words glaring. He could have chosen different words. He could have chosen to enter the political sphere as Mr. Maisonneuve, and run for office. But he decries cancel culture from two of the most elevated pulpits - the Vimy Gala, and a national newspaper, using his retired rank and medals as tinsel on his political position. Hardly cancelled. Thus, in my opinion, he demonstrates his arrogance, utter lack of self awareness and vacuous leadership.

    I did not know this man before his speech at the Vimy Gala. I do know many officers that do know him from their service whom I've spoken to. 

    And what I do know now is I would not follow this man into battle.

Chris Bowen