The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) has come under scrutiny for scandal and lack of leadership. Problematic leadership and students have made the news for many years. And so, I have a proposal. A proposal for change, and a proposal that may address problematic RMC results. Mme Arbour states that RMC (and its sister Collège militaire royale de Saint-Jean), are rife with a culture of hyper masculinity and sexual misconduct. She argues for a potential massive change in fixing these schools. And so, what to do?
Outline
Caveats and Disclaimers
Conceptual level
Diversity - Entry plans, gender, race, age, experience, elitism
Four pillars of RMC – Academics, Physical fitness, Bilingualism, Military
RMC Staff composition
Other Issues
Initiate Change
Summary
About the Author
Introduction
First, we can’t solve a problem if we don’t know clearly what the problem is. And second, the problem is likely complex. As Michael Power of the London School of Economics says, a boundary preserving problem solving model such as a process rather than a boundary expanding model that realizes the complexity and interconnectedness of the world is key. In other words, sit back and throw a few quick fixes at RMC within the CAF’s current model and we’ll likely not make substantive change. Realize that the model itself likely needs change due to the complex nature of the CAF, and we may get somewhere.
I propose comprehensive reform.
So, what is the RMC problem?
We’ve all seen the stories and incidents at RMC, mostly in the news. Some of us have firsthand experience with RMC, whether as a student or staff member. Many of us have interacted with RMC graduates or with the institution itself. We all have our stories and a narrative in our heads. And through this paper I’ll also submit some firsthand stories from life at RMC that will help to build a narrative. But as Power suggests, bounding a problem definition to just RMC would be foolish - we also must consider the wider CAF and recognize the complexity of the issues we wish to tackle.
What I propose as a problem definition is leadership.
Leadership. Leadership is a broad topic, but a topic that is at the core of the CAF officer ethos. As Charlotte Duval-Lantoine rightly argues when assessing the CAF responses to gender integration and sexual misconduct in her new book The Ones We Let Down, “Toxic leadership is at the roots of CF leaders’ inability to perform their duties and responsibilities”. The CAF has abundant leadership doctrine and studies. But the CAF, and specifically the officer corps, has demonstrated that it has been unable to lead itself through its scandals despite its branding itself the profession of arms.
As we move through this proposal, the connections and complexities of the CAF will become evident (if the reader doesn’t already agree). I will explore the connection of RMC to the institution in several ways. But tracing back to the core issue, the core problem of leadership, will be important to ground the discourse. Because if we don’t know the problem, we can’t solve it.
Caveats and Disclaimers
First. I’m no “expert”. Many will have issues with what I and others are about to propose to you. There will be barriers and arguments against my proposals. There will be disagreement in part or even in whole with what I present. But RMC is a construct that was deliberately put in place. Many of its issues, both public and private, are features not bugs. But it can be modified in part or in whole by the institution. There is no real barrier to progress, only process and resource barriers constructed by the institution itself. There is no excuse.
Second, I report to no one. I am simply a private citizen with a ground game knowledge of how the institution works in the areas I’ve had access to, gained from my perspectives, jobs, interactions, and duties. I do not claim to be omniscient, nor an expert at any one aspect of my proposals. I am a generalist, but with experience.
Third, I mean no ill will to any leader or organization. I have no agenda other than to offer my thoughts to the betterment of the CAF. My proposal may be timely with the current reconstitution directives, but I’ve not linked this proposal to any official process or person. I am open to debate on any issue I present, but I am also confident that through my previous consultations and debates these proposals have at least some merits.
Fourth, I have consulted reasonably widely with current and former CAF members, and others. Some may be identified, and others will remain anonymous for their own personal reasons. This is not a work done in isolation, though I have been selective at times with my consultations, preferring open and independent dialogue rather than dialogue with individuals that have vested interests in various areas.
Conceptual Level
So, I'll start with the conceptual level of leadership in the officer corps – development.
We have a well-established Officer Professional Development Framework (OPDF). But, like military justice and administrative discipline, its only effective if the CAF uses it properly. I'd argue the CAF has drifted away from the OPDF framework at points, and now we're seeing some results. I’ll not spend time defining what is readily available, so suffice it to say the Professional Development for Officers can be found here [1].
The Developmental Periods (DPs) are a reasonably good frame for this discussion. The DPs illustrate institutional and individual responsibilities throughout an officer’s career. I do not have issues with these DPs and their definitions, though some may, I have issues with how the DPs are managed and by whom. Going back to leadership as the core problem, leadership by the CAF and its responsible officers and agencies through the DP process must be examined.
In one example DP 2 was delegated to the services some time ago. The services do DP 2 well (CA through Fort Frontenac), are getting there (RCAF through the Air Warfare Centre), or not much at all (RCN, though this may change with the reconstitution of HMCS Venture. We will see). The DP 2 level of knowledge is extremely inconsistent when members show up at the front door at CFC for DP 3. Some have never been out of their service at the tactical level and have little CAF-wide knowledge. In fact, the old OPDP exams (cancelled some time ago) imparted balanced and consistent training and education on CAF wide issues to all CAF officers, albeit in a challenging paper and snail mail modality.
So, conceptually, we can be much better at managing the OPDF from an institutional perspective rather than a service perspective, and specifically ensuring Professional Military Education (PME) in DP 1 and 2 are consistent with the CAF’s competencies and values, even though we have a good framework.
Diversity
Diversity will be our strength - if we recognize it. So, much more diverse entry plans for officers, much more diverse degrees, much more diverse representation of genders, of all Canadians must be examined and potentially implemented. Example: it is proposed that the percentage of officer candidates graduating from RMC be reduced, and other entry plans be increased.
“RMC never felt to me like the preeminent source for leaders in the CAF.
It was but one source. DEOs, in my experience, presented with the most evenly
keeled leadership primarily due to their level of maturity when entering the
CAF” Major (retired) Charity Weedon.
This proposal would diversify the officer corps in several ways if managed well.
First, the percentage of RMC graduates versus every other officer entry plan should be reduced to allow for more influence by non-RMC grads. In fact there is little evidence, other than the exclusive club-like feel and networking of RMC graduates experience, that RMC officers are better leaders than non-RMC officers.
“I see a lot of TDV [truth, duty valour] in social media responses to crises at RMC” [indicating the club-like atmosphere of RMC graduates], Weedon says
“…I also found little proof for the widely accepted premise that the military colleges produced better officer candidates.”[2] Commander (retired) Ken Hansen
Second, if the degree selections of the officer corps were managed in a way to broaden the officer corps’ degrees, away from linear thinking STEM graduates, and towards a higher percentage of liberal arts, I argue that this would necessarily increase the possibility of critical thinking through a diversity of opinions and decrease the officer corps tendency to be comfortable in liner thinking.
A criticism that Dr Adam Chapnick of the CFC would have of moving away from STEM would be there is little evidence that STEM graduates have less ability for critical thinking. I partially agree with Dr Chapnick (though he is by far a more learned expert than I). I believe there is a structural bias towards male dominated STEM fields being the superior choice for students (one only must look to the sister institution in Kingston, ON – Queens to see that notion in action. In my opinion Queens Engineering is a case study in the superior choice for students). So in my unscientific opinion, and in the case of STEM being the superior choice and gendered towards male students, I believe there is a problematic bias and the potential for a serious lack of diversity of thought.
I believe this argument is supported by the increased appetite for design thinking [3] at DP 3 and 4. The toolbox of the CAF Operational Planning Process (OPP), and systems thinking with Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop overlays most certainly has come under heavy criticism for shallow and linear thinking. Having an officer with a Philosophy degree at the table is something quite different than having an officer with a civil engineering degree when thinking models are compared.
These diversity proposals require leadership. It is of no use to implement one of these proposals and not lead the institution through a transformation. Increasing diversity in entry plans, degrees, gender and other traits will take effort and leadership through possibly an entire generation of cadets before increased diversity is accepted as the norm.
RMC Pillars
The OPDF is a conceptual framework that all officers are subject to. The framework is managed by Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) on behalf of the Commander Military Personnel Command (Comd MPC). Essentially it is a cascading architecture starting with the CAF Values of integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship, and excellence on which organizational and functional competencies are nested. RMC’s pillars are a small subset of the OPDF at DP 1 and are academic, bilingualism, athletics, and military.
Academic
The academic pillar is the undergraduate
degree the cadet pursues while at RMC. The cadet follows the curriculum of the
degree they’ve been assigned or chosen, and the professors are mostly federal
public servants, though with collectively bargained academic freedom. RMC
offers post graduate studies up to the PhD level which are offered to mature
officers and civilians. It is notable that the academic staff at RMC holds no
real leadership role over cadets.
Bilingualism
Cadets must study a second
official language if they are not bilingual in French and English. While this
may be problematic for cadet’s study and other time commitments at RMC, it is a
Federally mandated programme. Officers must have certain levels of second
language capability to advance in their careers after RMC.
Athletics
“At least RMC doesn’t have a cheerleading squad”
“Recruit term traditions were male focused with thinly veiled attempt
to adapt to females at the college”
“Frat style games…boys will be boys…. We [women] stood to the side”
RMC has a comprehensive athletics programme. However, the programme is heavily biased towards male dominated teams such as ice hockey and rugby. Diversity in activities at RMC will also be required and this will also take leadership to develop.
Military
“Where are the adults?” a female ex cadet.
“First and most important lesson learned: ladies, lock your doors” a
female ex cadet
The military staff leading cadets at RMC is very small and former staff have reported a lack of capacity for appropriate supervision and control. This deficiency must be addressed by a multi layer approach. First, a revised DP 1 competency-based framework would do well to adjust the military pillar away from marching and basic skills towards a values and competency based programme. A draft competency based framework developed as part of an officer specification review is presented below at Figure 1 as a pictorial example, though the recent publication of The CAF Ethos: Trusted to Serve [4] is a comprehensive document. The construction of a military pillar with these frameworks as their foundation would ensure that the pillar would effectively do as much DP 1 as possible before evaluation for graduation as a commissioned officer.
Figure 1 - A draft
competency-based framework
In addition to these comments on the RMC pillars a sense of priority of the pillars must be given. If no priority is given the pillars may well become out of balance across the college – some will value athletics over academics, others the reverse. So, a priority designed to harmonize staff and student efforts alike might look like this:
1) CAF values (the base of the
competency base framework)
2) Academic Achievement
3) Bilingualism
4) DP 1 studies - Introduction to
Military Life/Military Trades
5) Military Administration
6) Physical Fitness training and
leading PT
7) Athletics
RMC Military Staff Composition
Second, a revised military staffing and structure is desperately needed and a proposed composition and structure is presented next. Staff must represent the best of the CAF to ensure proper mentorship and “what looks like right” to the cadets. To achieve this:
1) Staff must represent all CAF
services and trades – Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF),
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and trades that serve all services such as logistics
and engineers.
2) Staff must all be top third in their
rank/trade
3) Staff must all be screened for
toxic leadership/sociopathic tendencies, etc.
4) Staff must include appropriate bilingualism
5) Staff must have all led people
6) Only 50% should be RMC grads
7) A minimum of 70% of staff must be
women and visible minorities
8) Consideration for Regular and Reserve Force visiting academics on the military staff
From these basic requirements, we now look at the daily military leadership structure and then try to establish this structure on the requirement to mentor our future graduates. Thus, I would tend to structure the cadet leadership cadre as follows:
Commandant - BGen
Director Cadets - Col
Division Commanders - LCol (Post-Command)
Squadron Commanders - Majors
(Post-Command)
Flight Commanders - Captains
(Post-DP2)
Section Commanders for 4th Years -
UTPNCM Candidates
Section Commanders for 3rd Years -
Selected Sr NCOs
Section Commanders for 2nd Years -
Selected Captains (non-DP2)
Section Commanders for 1st Years -
Selected Sr NCOs
So how would the CAF fill staff positions at RMC? The links from RMC to the CAF are important here. The CAF is routinely at 60% effectively bodies in seats. High readiness deployable units and structures are of course filled – a ship cannot sail with 60% of its crew. But the lack of effectively trained personnel puts limits on the personnel available for staffs. Placing a demand on the CAF to fill positions at RMC with the above proposal would receive serious push back from commanders reticent to lose their best members. To counter the inevitable push back first, and secondly to incentivize members to want to be posted away from their career stream to RMC, measures must be put in place such as promotion board points equivalent to a deployment or a command, and a percentage (a selected 5% of RMC and NCO graduates may be an appropriate target) to remain on staff each year, which continuously feeds the staff with capable and knowledgeable members. In fact, I argue that operations can be conducted by the average officer quite competently. Where you want your best officers is in education and training.
Other Issues
In addition to the proposals above, RMC should deliver DP 1, and DP 2 level PME at RMC via hybrid virtual and residential programmes. If implemented, the CAF will ensure all officers (including Regular Force, Reserve Force and potentially Cadet Instructor Cadre) have contact with RMC and deliver robust CAF level PME. This proposal would have multiple effects: standardizing the officer that leaves DP 2, ensuring we look all officers in the eye before they move to DP 3, and adding the networking component that DP 2 officers that never leave their service until DP 3 do not have. This proposal meshes with the idea that the RMC cadet population be reduced to allow for more diverse entry plans which in turn reduces the cadet population and makes physical and intellectual space for a more robust PME education delivery.
Mme Arbour’s proposal to move towards a UK “Sandhurst model” of a years long non degreed military academy must be addressed. As this author has stated elsewhere [5] the academic capabilities of RMC are great value to Canada’s research and thinking in national defence and international affairs. Losing that academic function by transforming RMC into a non-degreed military academy would be a loss for the wider national security apparatus in Canada as some of the leading independent thinkers in this space in Canada are RMC academics.
Initiate Change
Risk case
There is risk in this proposal. I
have written extensively on risk in the past [6],
and in general I believe that the CAF does not handle risk well. And in that
weakness is a lack of leadership again. Given the plethora of issues
surrounding RMC, a risk approach with appropriate analysis must be adopted.
Leadership
As proposed the core issue I’ve
identified is leadership. The barriers to progress at RMC are none in my view. The
problematic results of RMC can be changed. It will take leadership.
Accountability
Finally, the issues surrounding
RMC have less chance of correction without accountability. The issues
surrounding RMC appear to be endemic and have occurred over a long period of
time, with no visible accountability mechanism. Too often in the CAF very
senior leaders move on and are never held accountable for any failures on their
watch.
Summary
In summary, my proposal retains RMC but transitions CAF officer entry programmes to less RMC degreed officers and more diverse non-RMC degrees for the academic pillar which would increase the diversity of officers entering the CAF. I propose increasing CAF level PME delivered virtually and at RMC in DP 1 and 2 specifically, a staff transformation, and hard power by incentivizing RMC postings by promotion board points and by retaining a select 5% of students as staff (at CFC the math worked out to refreshing the entire staff over 5 years give a standard 3 year posting). The PME delivered should be competency based. The RMC itself must change its staff structure to include more supervision and higher achieving officers and NCOs through incentives to attract top talent.
Thus, a transformation of RMC into a more PME focused institution, harmonizing the early development of officers, but also diversifying the officer corps could be achieved.
What follows must be leadership of the transformation and not just boundary preserving fixes. Leadership will provide an example for all officers to emulate, and it will nurture these ongoing efforts at RMC change and tied to leadership must also be an accountability framework.
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel (retired)
Chris Bowen served as an Air Navigator and later Air Combat Systems Officer for
35 years in air operations, flight testing, Canadian, NATO and coalition
staffs, training, and education roles. He received a Bachelor of Arts as a
civilian and entered the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) under the Direct Entry
Officer (DEO) plan. He went on to graduate from the University of Nottingham
with a Master of Science, and the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) with a
Master of Defence Studies. He retired in 2022 from the Canadian Forces College
(CFC).
[1] https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education-training/professional-development/framework/officers.html
[2] https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-reforms-to-canadas-ineffective-royal-military-colleges-are-long/
[4] https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-ethos-trusted-to-serve.html
[5] Patrick
Cain, ipolitics.ca, https://www.ipolitics.ca/news/would-reforming-canadas-military-colleges-help-cadets-grow-into-better-officers
[6] Taming The Leviathan - A New Approach To Risk For The Military Leader, Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. E. Bowen 28 August 2012, Canadian Forces College, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/303/171/171-eng.html?search_where=title&keywords=leviathan&programLimit=all&yearLimit=all&submit=Search
